On October 29, 2023, a senior emergency official from the Generalitat Valenciana testified that the regional government was aware of the overflow of the Poyo ravine, which triggered a severe flooding crisis, by 6:45 PM. This admission was made during a court hearing conducted by Judge Nuria Ruiz Tobarra, who is investigating the circumstances surrounding the disaster.

Despite having this information, the Generalitat did not issue a mass alert to mobile phones until 8:11 PM, by which time numerous fatalities, disappearances, and individuals were trapped in ground-level homes and garages had been reported.

Judge Tobarra has indicated that the delay in alerting the public is a key focus of the investigation and connects this tardiness to the fatalities.

J. R. Cuevas, who serves as the head of Risk Analysis and Monitoring at the CECOPI, the emergency management body of the Generalitat, stated in his judicial testimony that the mass notification system, known as Es Alert, had been prepared since 5:00 PM. Cuevas confirmed that he was responsible for delivering the alert, which was drafted by the former Minister of Justice and Interior, Salomé Pradas, during the flooding event.

He noted that the message was generic and did not instruct the population to move to higher floors.

Cuevas further detailed that Pradas arrived at approximately 7:45 PM with the finalized wording for the alert, which was designed to cover the entire province of Valencia.

He emphasized that the notification was not sent until authorized by Pradas, despite a chaotic situation unfolding in the CECOPI control room, where multiple staff members were overwhelmed by the increasing number of emergency alerts.

During the hearing, Cuevas recounted being informed by a representative of the Agencia Española de Meteorología (AEMET) at 4:30 PM that the storm system would be moving towards the Serranía de Cuenca.

He did not relay this information to anyone in the control room.

Valencia's president, Mazón, had similarly downplayed the severity of the situation earlier that morning, describing a university’s decision to cancel classes as an “overreaction.”

The risk of flooding had been apparent since the day prior, with the AEMET warning of severe weather and issuing an alert at 11:00 PM on October 28. On the day of the floods, they escalated the severity level to red, the highest on their scale, by 7:36 AM, forecasting precipitation exceeding 180 liters per square meter.

Cuevas expressed skepticism about the reliability of the predictions made by AEMET, citing numerous abrupt changes in forecasts leading up to the event.

When questioned by the judge on why institutions such as the University of Valencia had deemed AEMET’s warnings sufficient for critical decisions, Cuevas suggested that the university had responsibilities to consider, given the diverse population it serves.

He denied having any connection with the two individuals currently under indictment in the case, Pradas and her former deputy, Emilio Argüeso.

Lastly, Cuevas explained that follow-up reports regarding emergency situations were routinely prepared, compiling data on issues like power supply and public transportation outages to inform senior government officials, as confirmed in earlier testimonies by other regional administration workers.

He described the process of notifying municipal leaders—mayors and councilors—via email, phone, and fax about the magnitude of the impending deluge across various regions, including La Ribera Alta, La Ribera Baixa, La Safor, and several municipalities within the Canal de Navarrés.