On February 2, 2022, the European Commission proposed a green taxonomy that aimed to classify nuclear and natural gas as green sources of electricity generation, paving the way for investments.

At that time, the global context was significantly different, as the world was still grappling with the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, and energy prices were rising sharply.

The geopolitical landscape shifted dramatically just weeks later with Russia's invasion of Ukraine, leading to a renewed focus on energy sovereignty across Europe.

Initially, reactions to the taxonomy proposal were polarized.

Supporters of nuclear energy, led by France, clashed with Germany and other nations favoring natural gas, while Spain emerged as a prominent opponent.

By July 2022, the taxonomy gained approval, but the current discourse surrounding nuclear energy has since become more binary: nuclear energy yes or nuclear energy no.

Notably, Germany has shifted its stance and is now open to considering nuclear energy as renewable in EU legislation, as reported.

Ignacio Araluce, president of Foro Nuclear, noted that Germany's nuclear policy pivot is a response to its complete phase-out of nuclear power, which has left the country vulnerable.

Following the cessation of gas supplies from Russia's Nord Stream pipeline, Germany was compelled to delay the closure of its nuclear plants and revert to coal—one of its primary energy sources alongside wind and solar energy today.

Araluce suggested that Germany is exploring the possibility of redefining nuclear energy’s image and considering the introduction of small modular reactors while refraining from reactivating decommissioned facilities.

Germany's new support for nuclear energy coincides with similar decisions among other European nations, as energy security becomes a pressing concern after the onset of the Ukraine conflict.

Belgium, which voted on May 15, 2023, decided to abandon its initial plans to close nuclear plants by 2025, allowing for the construction of new facilities.

The Netherlands has also extended the operational life of its sole reactor and plans to commission another by 2035.

Denmark, traditionally known for its green energy policies, is contemplating the reintroduction of nuclear power after abandoning it in 1985. The Danish Minister for Energy and Climate, Lars Aagaard, recently indicated the potential inclusion of small modular reactors in their energy mix, although public acceptance remains a significant factor in the decision-making process.

The geopolitical implications of Germany's shift may have broader consequences for the European energy landscape.

Julio Guinea, a law professor at the European University, emphasized this moment as a strategic turning point.

He remarked that if the historically influential Franco-German axis becomes active in shaping Europe’s energy model, it denotes a critical development in the region's geopolitical framework.

This shift encompasses not only energy security but also industrial competitiveness and Europe’s strategic sovereignty.

A crucial aspect of this transition is the impact on hydrogen production, which is increasingly viewed as a key component for decarbonization across sectors that are not easily electrifiable, such as maritime transport.

Hydrogen can be produced via electrolysis—yielding either green hydrogen from renewable electricity or pink hydrogen from nuclear electricity.

The classification of pink hydrogen carries significant implications, as nuclear plants can operate with high reliability, unlike renewable sources which may be intermittent.

Guinea further noted that this energy dialogue seems to be centered around Paris and Berlin rather than the broader EU framework.

This raises concerns about a paradox where, despite calls for common policies, individual member states retain control over their energy mixes, potentially fragmenting Europe’s collective response to continental challenges.

In Spain, these developments could lead to consequential discussions regarding energy interconnections.

Guinea highlighted that Spain occupies a middle ground—having successfully championed renewable energy, yet facing a chronic structural weakness due to its limited interconnections with other countries.

Currently, the interconnection rate with France stands at approximately 3% of Spain's generating capacity, with a targeted increase to 10% by 2030, a goal that appears ambitious in the current climate.

The ongoing isolation may weaken Spain's political clout regarding the future of Europe's energy strategy.

France and Germany possess robust connections and are making bilateral agreements that will shape the continent's nuclear strategy.

As Guinea pointed out, Spain, alongside other southern and eastern European nations, risks being sidelined in critical energy decision-making processes.

He argued for a foundational shift in Europe from operating as a collection of 27 national energy strategies to becoming an integrated energy actor akin to the eurozone or internal market initiatives.

As the global nuclear landscape evolves, the International Energy Agency (IEA) reported that 2024 witnessed the commissioning of 7 GW of nuclear power worldwide—a 33% increase compared to 2023. The total installed nuclear capacity has now reached approximately 420 GW, with six new reactors completed in countries including China, the United States, France, and India.

Currently, there are 62 reactors under construction across 15 countries, accounting for 70 GW of power capacity, with nearly half of this volume located in China.

Other countries, including Egypt, India, and Turkey, are advancing their nuclear programs, while Japan, South Korea, and the United Kingdom have begun work on two reactors each.

Furthermore, construction on nine additional reactors is slated to commence in 2024, projected to add 11 GW of capacity.

These newly launched projects have long gestation periods and do not reflect the recent geopolitical shifts, thus any meaningful impact from the recent pro-nuclear climate is anticipated only after 2030. In Spain, the issue is further complicated as the scheduled closure of the national nuclear fleet is set to begin in 2027 with the Almaraz plant and will culminate in 2035 with the Trillo plant.