The Valencian government considered sending an emergency alert regarding the DANA (an episodic severe weather phenomenon) approximately one and a half hours before the notification was actually dispatched.

Miguel M., the head of the region's emergency services, confirmed this fact during a testimony at a court in Catarroja, Valencia, as part of an investigation into the flooding that left 228 dead in October.

He stated that the subdirector of emergency services, Jorge Suárez, first proposed sending an EsAlert—an emergency alert to mobile phones—at 18:36. However, the final alert reached residents’ phones at 20:11, by which time multiple fatalities, disappearances, and residents trapped in ground floors and garages had been reported.

This delay has become a pivotal point in the ongoing investigation.

Judge Nuria Ruiz Tobarra claims that the timing of this notification significantly increased the death toll.

The testimony from the emergency chief contrasts sharply with claims made earlier in April by former Justice and Interior Minister Salomé Pradas, who asserted that the government began considering the alert only around 19:00. Pradas appeared as an accused party, allowing her to present potentially misleading information.

In contrast, the emergency official's testimony was given under obligation to tell the truth.

Miguel M.'s statements confirmed that the idea of sending out the alert was raised during a meeting of the Cecopi, the emergency coordination body, between 18:00 and 19:00. However, there was a disruption during this meeting that prevented connected institutions, including the Delegation of the Government of the Valencian Community, from participating in the debate on the advisability and content of the alert.

Pradas reportedly used this interruption to contact President Carlos Mazón at 18:15, a conversation whose content remains unclear.

The emergency chief, who was telecommuting on the day of the disaster, acknowledged that he managed to validate the alert message from home and was informed about ongoing communication issues.

"I connected remotely," he said.

"I was told that sending an EsAlert was possible and that we should remain alert."

He outlined that there were 23 personnel authorized to compose EsAlert messages on the day of the DANA.

Despite being alerted at 18:36 about the potential to send the message, Suárez called him again at 20:08 to confirm the alert, which was sent three minutes later, reporting the overflowing of the Poyo ravine, which triggered the catastrophe.

The interactions between the emergency chief and Suárez were complicated by communication difficulties.

"At 20:08, I received a two-second call from Suárez that was cut off, followed by another from a landline lasting two minutes and 35 seconds," he explained, noting the poor audio quality during the calls.

When questioned about direct communications with senior officials in the Justice and Interior Department, which managed the crisis, the emergency chief indicated that his communication was limited to Suárez, the technical lead.

This testimony marks the second instance where an emergency official stated that Cecopi considered two alerts: a first alert regarding potential dam failure at Forata, which could have resulted in up to 20,000 deaths, and the alert that was eventually issued concerning the risks related to the Poyo ravine.

This particular testimony, carried out under oath, compelled him to provide truthful statements, as false testimony would put him at risk of being charged.

He was required to answer questions from various parties, including the judge, prosecutor, defense counsel, and both private and popular prosecution lawyers.

The recent testimony follows another one from a technical emergency official who stated that Pradas instructed him not to send any alerts until she provided approval.

This assertion contradicts Pradas's legal strategy, which seeks to transfer responsibility onto the technical staff.

Meanwhile, the prosecution has rejected a motion from Pradas seeking to invalidate the transcript of her earlier testimony, asserting it is “incorrect and incomplete.” The prosecution maintains that the essential aspect is the audio recording of the three-hour session and states that any claimed inaccuracies in the document should be specified.

The public prosecutor is also favorable to a motion enabling the Guardia Civil to request data from the Ministry for Ecological Transition regarding the Buseo Reservoir to construct a timeline for the day of the DANA.

This includes details about measurement systems, decisions regarding gate openings between 08:00 and 22:00 on October 29, and the public alert protocols in place for these infrastructures.

Furthermore, the prosecution opposes a request by the popular accusation, represented by the Acció Cultural del País Valencià association, to obtain information on the mobile phones of officials, a request previously denied by the judge on privacy grounds.

Additionally, José María Bueno, attorney for Emilio Argüeso, the deputy secretary of emergencies during the DANA and now under investigation, argued that there is no conflict of interest in representing Argüeso while also working with the Manos Limpias pseudo-syndicate, which is a part of the popular accusation.

The judge questioned the compatibility of this role as the organization has sought to pursue legal actions against Argüeso.

Bueno advised ignoring misleading online information and focusing on factual realities, as reflected in his written defenses for Argüeso.